PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EQUALITY: INSIGHTS FROM NYAYA PHILOSOPHY
##semicolon##
https://doi.org/10.8224/journaloi.v73i3.1033सार
This paper analyzes the concept of equality in Nyāya philosophy and its relevance to contemporary debates on equality and fairness. Nyāya's definition of justice goes beyond material allocation and focuses on true knowledge, fair methods, equality, and no bias. This study compares justice in three traditions: Aristotle's proportionate equality theory, the classical Nyāya school of Indian philosophy, and John Rawls' liberal framework. According to Aristotle, justice is treating everyone fairly, differentiating between distributive and corrective forms, and basing fairness on virtue and the pursuit of the "good life." Nyāya, in contradiction, integrated epistemology, ethics, and legal reasoning, emphasizing truth, procedural integrity, and the reduction of bias as essential to justice. Rawls reimagined fairness in terms of the “original position” and “veil of ignorance,” offering a consensual model aimed at securing equal basic liberties and fair distribution of social goods. By placing these perspectives in dialogue, this paper highlights both their commonalities, such as the concern for fairness, order, and their distinctive contributions, with Nyāya philosophy expanding the epistemic dimension of justice, Aristotle focusing on moral virtue and proportionality, and Rawls focusing on institutional fairness. Together, these frameworks enrich contemporary debates by demonstrating that justice is not a singular concept but a plural and evolving ideal, shaped across diverse cultures and philosophical traditions.



