SAMAVĀYA AS A UNIQUE CATEGORY: A LOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL INQUIRY
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.8224/journaloi.v74i3.1010Keywords:
Samavāya, Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika, Padārtha, Inherence, Relation, Universals, ParticularsAbstract
The Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika tradition introduces samavāya (inherence) as a distinct ontological category (padārtha) to account for relations of inseparable dependence that cannot be explained through conjunction (saṃyoga) or identity (tādātmya). These include the relations between substance and quality, whole and parts, and universal and particular. While often criticized as an unnecessary metaphysical multiplication, samavāya plays a foundational role in preserving Nyāya realism, semantic objectivity, and the correspondence theory of truth (yathārthavāda). The present study undertakes a systematic logical and metaphysical investigation of samavāya, with particular reference to Annambhaṭṭa’s Tarkasaṅgraha and its modern interpretation by V. N. Jha. The paper argues that samavāya is not an ad hoc explanatory device but a carefully articulated ontological principle introduced to resolve specific philosophical problems arising within a realist framework. These problems include the unity of composite objects, the grounding of predication, and the instantiation of universals in particulars. By reconstructing the inferential motivations for positing samavāya, the paper demonstrates that its acceptance is internally coherent within Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika metaphysics and epistemology. In addition to textual reconstruction, the study engages critically with major objections to samavāya, including charges of ontological inflation, infinite regress, and epistemic inaccessibility. These objections are examined through the traditional Indian dialectical method of pūrvapakṣa and uttarapakṣa. The Nyāya responses, particularly as refined in later and Navya-Nyāya literature, reveal a sophisticated understanding of relational ontology that anticipates several concerns of contemporary metaphysics. The paper further situates samavāya within a comparative philosophical context by relating it to modern discussions on instantiation, constitution, grounding, and mereology. While avoiding forced equivalences, it is argued that samavāya functions analogously to grounding relations in contemporary analytic philosophy, though with a stronger ontological commitment. This comparative dimension highlights the continuing relevance of classical Indian metaphysics for global philosophical discourse.



